In this paper the class of fuzzy clan games is introduced. The cores of such games have an interesting shape which inspires to define a class of compensation-sharing rules that are additive and stable on the cone of fuzzy clan games. Further, the notion of bi-monotonic participation allocation scheme (bi-pamas) is introduced and it turns out that each core element of a fuzzy clan game is extendable to a bi-pamas.
Introduction
Cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced in Aubin (1974) . Such games are helpful for approaching sharing problems arising from economic situations where agents have the possibility to cooperate with different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation, and where the obtained reward depends on the levels of participation. A fuzzy coalition describes the participation levels to which each player is involved in cooperation. Classical cooperative games, which model situations where agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, can then be seen as a simplified version of games with fuzzy coalitions. In the pioneering work of Aubin the focus was on the core of cooperative fuzzy games and on the Shapley value. Since 1974 much research has been done in the field of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions. For a survey the reader is referred to Nishizaki and Sakawa (2001) . As in the classical cooperative game theory, some classes of games with fuzzy coalitions deserve special attention. The class of convex fuzzy games is introduced in Branzei et al. (2002) together with the notion of participation monotonic scheme (pamas), the existence of which is assured by the convexity of the game. Some additive and monotonic rules on the convex cone of convex fuzzy games are also considered (Proposition 8, in Branzei et al. (2002) ). In the classical cooperative game theory extensive attention is paid to monotonicity properties of solution concepts (see Young (1985) , Moulin (1988) , Sprumont (1990) )). Additivity of rules on specific cones of cooperative TU-games is also an important research topic (see Shapley (1953) , Dragan et al. (1989) , Branzei and Tijs (2001) , Tijs and Branzei (2002) ).
In this paper we introduce a new class of games with partly fuzzy coalitions, namely the class of fuzzy clan games (and its subclass of fuzzy big boss games,) and focus on the core and bi-monotonic allocation schemes and rules. Inspired by and Voorneveld et al. (2000) who consider the notion of bi-monotonic allocation scheme (bi-mas) for classical total big boss and total clan games, respectively, we introduce here for fuzzy clan games the notion of bi-monotonic participation allocation scheme (bi-pamas). Big boss games and clan games are introduced in classical cooperative game theory by Muto et al. (1988) and Potters et al. (1989) , respectively; see also Tijs (1990) .
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly recall some notions and facts from the theory of games with fuzzy coalitions. The notion of fuzzy clan game is introduced and exemplified in Section 3. Further, in Section 4, the cores of a fuzzy clan game (and a fuzzy big boss game, respectively) and its restricted games are explicitly described and the geometrical shape of the core is discussed.
Compensation-sharing rules and the notion of bi-participation monotonic allocation scheme (bi-pamas) are introduced in Section 5. It turns out that each compensation-sharing rule is additive, stable and generates for each game a bi-pamas, and each core element of a fuzzy clan game is bi-pamas extendable. We conclude with some final remarks in Section 6. 
Preliminaries on games with fuzzy coalitions

FG
The core (Aubin (1974) ) of a fuzzy game is defined by v
Here is the inner product of ∑ 
By means of restricted games Branzei et al. (2002) have extended the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) for cooperative crisp games (Sprumont (1990) ) to that of participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas) in the context of cooperative fuzzy games. Convexity of the fuzzy game (and its restricted games) is a sufficient condition for the existence of a pamas.
The cone of fuzzy clan games
There are various economic situations where the group of agents involved consists of two subgroups with different status: a "clan" whose members can "manage" the situation and a set of available agents willing to join the clan. However, the non-clan members are completely dependent on the collective of clan members in the sense that a coalition never can obtain a positive reward if not all clan members are present in the coalition. Such situations are modeled in the classical theory of cooperative games with transferable utility by means of (total) clan games where only the full cooperation and non-cooperation at all of non-clan members with the clan are taken into account. Here we take over this simplifying assumption and allow non-clan members to cooperate with all clan members and some other non-clan members to a certain extent. As a result the notion of fuzzy clan game is introduced.
Let
be a finite set of players. We denote the non-empty set of clan members by , and treat clan members as crisp players. where the participation level of non-clan members may vary between 0 and 1.
In this section fuzzy clan games are defined using veto power of clan members, monotonicity, and a condition reflecting the fact that a decrease in participation level of a non-clan member in growing coalitions containing at least all clan members with full participation level results in a decrease of the average marginal return of that player (DAMR-property).
Formally, a game is a fuzzy clan game if satisfies the following three v properties:
(i) (veto-power of clan members)
(iii) (DAMR-property for n n-clan members) for 
and with the decreasing average marginal return property.
otherwise, is a fuzzy clan game with clan . 
Then has the veto power property for members in and the monotonicity property, but not the DAMR-property with respect to members of , hence it is not a fuzzy clan game. This game can be seen as arising from a voting situation where to pass the bill all members of have to (fully) agree and the sum of the support levels of
, where s ( s ) correspond to full support (no support) of the bill, but also partial supports count. , that is for all and , , where denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
Now we show that for each game the corresponding crisp game is a total clan game if
, and a total big boss game if 1 .
Let . The corresponding crisp game has the following properties which follow straightforwardly from the properties of :
for all with (where means for each );
So, is a total clan game in the terminology of Voorneveld et al. (2000) if , and a total big boss game in the terminology of Branzei et al. (2001) if .
In the following we consider t -restricted games corresponding to a fuzzy clan game and prove, in Proposition 1, that these games are also fuzzy clan games.
and . Recall that the t -restricted game of with respect to is given by for each . 
is a concave function.
The function is said to have the submodularity p operty on if for all , where
with the i coordinate equal, for each i , to max{ and min{ , respectively. 
Proof. Applying the coordinate-wise concavity of and the property of tangent lines to the graph of in one obtains .
(Q.E.D.)
The core of fuzzy clan games
The main aim of this section is to provide an explicit description of the core of a fuzzy clan game and give some insight into its geometrical shape. We start with a lemma. Lemma 2. Let and let . Then .
Let and be the sequences of fuzzy coalitions on given by 
where the inequality follows from the submodularity property of applied for each . Now for each we have by Lemma 1 
Proof. We only prove ( ). We use now the monotonicity property and the coordinate-wise concavity property of obtaining that exists and this limit is equal to .
Hence , thus implying that is a subset of the set on the right side of the equality in ( ). 
The inequality follows then from Lemma 2.
The core of a fuzzy clan game has an interesting geometric shape. It is the intersection of a simplex with 'hyperbands' corresponding to the non-clan members. To be more precise, for fuzzy clan games (and fuzzy big boss games with ), we have 
is the region between the two parallel hyperplanes in , and , which we call the 'hyperband' corresponding to .
An interesting core element is , with
, which corresponds to the point with a central location in this geometric structure. Note that is in the intersection of middle-hyperplanes of all hyperbands , , and it has the property that the coordinates corresponding to clan members are equal.
Example 3. For a 3-person fuzzy big boss game with player 3 as the big boss and the core has the shape of a parallelogram ( in the imputation set) with vertices:
Note that is the middle point of this parallelogram.
( ) 
for each . Then is a fuzzy big boss game with player 2 as the big boss, and
The next lemma plays a role in the rest of the paper. . . Then for each the core of the t -restricted game is described by
Proof. We only prove (i). Let , with
Then, by the definition of the core of a fuzzy game, . Since and since, by Proposition 1, is itself a fuzzy clan game, we can apply Theorem 1(i), thus obtaining
Now we apply Lemma 3. (Q.E.D.)
Monotonic allocation rules and bi-pamas
Let and
. We introduce for each and 
The multi-function which assigns to each the subset of is additive.
for all v and all , so
is additive on the cone of fuzzy clan games. The stability follows from Theorem 1.
(ii) Clearly, each . Conversely, let
. Then, according to
Note that is the fuzzy coalition where each non-clan member has participation level 0 and each clan-member has participation level 1. We have Inequality (3) expresses the fact that the group of clan members is left a non-negative amount in the grand coalition.
The fact that for each i ) (
But then there is a vector
, and , for each , otherwise). Hence . 
, where the inequality follows from the DAMR-property of , with
Then for each and
the compensation-sharing rule generates a bi-monotonic participation allocation scheme for , namely .
Proof. We treat only the case 1 > C . In Theorem 2(i) we have proved that for each the core Core of the t -restricted game is given by
Then, for each non-clan member the i α -based compensation (regardless of β ) in the "grand coalition" of the t -restricted game is . Hence,
First we prove that for each non-clan member the compensation per unit of participation level is weakly decreasing when the coalition containing all clan members with full participation level and in which player is active (i.e. ) becomes larger. 
First we prove that for each with
Inequality (4) expresses the fact that the remainder for the clan members is weakly larger in larger coalitions (when non-clan members increase their participation level). 2000)). In the next example we consider a fuzzy approach to holding situations leading to a fuzzy big boss game.
Let with
Example 5. Let agents 1 and 2 have goods to be stored and let agent 3 possess a holding 
